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1962] RECENT DECISIONS 823 
REsTlTUTION-QUASI-CONTRACT-NON-CONFORMANCE WITH STATE BUii.D-
iNG CONTRACTORS LICENSING STATUTE AS BASIS FOR DENIAL OF llEsTITUTION-
Defendants, owners of an apartment building containing stores and living 
units, contracted with plaintiff to replace the roof of the building. Pursuant 
to the contract plaintiff replaced the roof, and when defendants refused to 
pay for the work done, plaintiff sued in the alternative for damages on the 
contract or for restitution on an implied contract.1 Defendants moved for 
dismissal at pre-trial, contending that plaintiff was a residential alteration 
contractor and as such was required by state statute to have a license in or-
der to bring an action for the collection of compensation.2 On appeal from 
pre-trial orders dismissing the suit and denying a motion for rehearing, 
held, affirmed. Statutory provisions precluding unlicensed alteration con-
tractors from maintaining an action to recover for services rendered ap-
plied to the plaintiff and prevented him from recovering the cost of the 
roof installed, either on the contract or in restitution. Alexander v. Neal, 
364 Mich. 485, llO N.W.2d 797 (1961). 
The purpose of restitution is to remedy the fact that one party has 
been unjustly enriched at another's expense.3 In order that the requisite 
enrichment be found, it is necessary that an advantage be secured or a 
benefit be received and retained, either by obtaining services or property, 
or by saving money.4 Even where a person •has secured an advantage at 
the expense of another, however, he is liable to pay for it only if the 
circumstances of its receipt or retention are such t:hat, as between the two 
persons, it is unjust for him to retain it.5 Thus, where the original intent 
of the plaintiff was to confer a gift or gratuity upon the defendant, courts 
will not find a right of restitution when the plaintiff seeks recovery of 
that gift or its value. Nor will a court aid one who voluntarily confers a 
benefit upon another without having received any express or implied prom-
ise of reimbursement. In addition to being available as an alternative 
remedy for breach of contract,6 restitutionary recoveries may be extended 
to situations where, even though a party would not be able to recover on 
1 Brief for Appellant, p. 5a (declaration), Alexander v. Neal, 364 Mich. 485, 110 
N.W .2d 797 (1961). 
2 MICH, STAT. ANN. § 18.86(16) (1957). See note 27 infra, for text of the provision. 
3 See Herrmann v. Gleason, 126 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1942); see generally 5 CORBIN, 
CoNTRACTS § 1104 (1951). 
4 See R.EsrA'IEMENT, REsrrruTION § 1, comment b (1937). 
5 Id. comment c. 
G See, e.g., United States v. Zara Contracting Co., 146 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1944). 
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a contract, clie injustice of the other contracting party's enrichment re-
quires relief. Furthermore, restitutionary relief may be afforded where no 
actual pecuniary enrichment has occurred, if it would be unjust not to 
grant recovery for the value of services rendered or property transferred 
or utilized.7 In the principal case there was obviously an undeserved 
enrichment, since defendants received a roof without paying for it. How-
ever, an enrichment which the defendant does not deserve is not always 
deemed to be unjust as to the plaintiff. The court's denial of the restitu-
tionary remedy because the contract was unlawful8 must therefore be con-
strued as a determination that, because of the illegality of plaintiff's act, 
defendant's receipt and retention of this benefit was not, under the cir-
cumstances, unjust to plaintiff.9 
In many cases, although not uniformly, the illegality of an act by the 
plaintiff has been sufficient to absolve the defendant's enrichment of its 
unjustness. These courts seem to find it good policy to deny restitution 
in order to penalize plaintiff for, and deter others from, such illegal acts. 
The broad rationale given by courts refusing restitution is that the grant-
ing of restitution would be contrary to "public policy,"10 since it encour-
ages illegal transactions11 and circumvents the law.12 Some courts deny 
restitutionary relief to punish the plaintiff,13 or because he is said to have 
disqualified himself from seeking the aid of the court.14 Many courts, how-
ever, do grant restitutionary relief in such situations, reasoning that re-
gardless of the illegality of the contract, the enrichment is unjust, espe-
cially where the penalty would be utterly disproportionate to the offense.11i 
These courts further rationalize that the plaintiff is actually disaffirming 
7 See REsTATEMENT, REsrrrunoN § 1, comment e (1937). 
s MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.86(1) (1957). See note 24 infra, for text of the provision. 
9 Where transactions or contracts have been declared unlawful for failure to comply 
with statutory requirements, some courts have nevertheless allowed restitutionary re-
covery. See Cook v. Sherman, 20 Fed. 167 (C.C. Iowa 1882) (corporate directors' contract); 
Lund v. Bruflat, 159 Wash. 89, 292 Pac. 112 (1930) (unlicensed plumber; restitution 
limited to materials furnished). But see Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal. 119, 57 Pac. 777 
(1899) (unlicensed lawyer); Enterprise Frame & Novelty Corp. v. Schieman, 183 Misc. 3, 
49 N.Y.S.2d 860 (N.Y. City Ct. 1944) (Emergency Price Control Act). 
10 Yet, judges sometimes seem to use a "public policy" analysis to justify their per-
sonal beliefs. See Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (C.P. 
1824). ("It is never argued at all but when other points fail.') 
11 McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639 (1899). 
12 E.g., Le John Mfg. Co. v. Webb, 222 F.2d 48 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Gesellschaft,Fiir 
Drahtlose Telegraphic M.B.H. v. Brown, 78 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 
618 (1935). This rationale is most often used where recovery in restitution would be 
nearly equal to recovery on the contract itself. See ·wade, Benefits Obtained Under 
Illegal Transactions-Reasons for and Against Allowing Restitution, 25 TEXAS L. REv. 
31, 32 (1946). 
13 E.g., Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B. 1775). 
14 See Wade, supra note 12, at 37. 
15 See Wigmore, A Summary of Quasi-Contract, 25 AM. L. REv. 695, 712 (note) (1891). 
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the illegal contract16 and requesting the court only to restore a value 
belonging to him.17 Another consideration is that the denial of restitu-
tionary recovery to the plaintiff would foster fraud, encouraging the de-
fendant who knows the law to swindle the plaintiff by enticing him to 
perform his illegal contract to the fullest.is 
Although the specific issue presented in the principal case was before 
the Michigan Supreme Court for the first time, the court has been pre-
sented with analogous situations in the past. Where a contract for the 
sale of goods was void because it was made on Sunday, the court granted 
restitution to the vendor;19 but where a contract for the sale of land was 
invalid because of non-compliance with the Statute of Frauds, the court, 
apparently finding a stronger legislative intent than in the Sunday case, 
denied restitution to the broker.20 However, if in a contract not involving 
realty unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds one-year rule21 one 
party had fully performed, the court would grant him restitution.22 
The principal case thus came before a court which has not been consistent 
as to its granting of the restitutionary remedy; and, seemingly, there are 
factors in the principal case which militate strongly against the denial of 
relief. 
The purpose of the relevant statute is to safeguard and protect home 
owners and those who undertake to become home owners,23 requiring the 
obtaining of a license before one may engage in residential building 
and/or maintenance and alteration contracting.24 A license may be ob-
tained if one maintains a place of business in Michigan, passes a written 
examination establishing a fair knowledge of English and an ability to 
16 See Wade, supra note 12, at 54. 
17 See Planters Bank v. Union Bank, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 483 (1872); McMullen v. 
Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639 (1899) (dictum). Contra, Brown v. Timmany, 20 Ohio 81 (1851). 
18 See Wade, supra note 12, at 57. 
rn Tucker v. Mowrey, 12 Mich. 378 (1864). Accord, Rott v. Goldman, 236 Mich. 261, 
210 N.W. 335 (1926). 
!!O Paul v. Graham, 193 Mich. 447, 160 N.W. 616 (1916). Accord, McCarthy v. Loupe, 
62 Cal. 299 (1882); Weatherhead v. Cooney, 32 Idaho 127, 180 Pac. 760 (1919); Hale v. 
Kreisel, 194 Wis. 271, 215 N.W. 227 (1927). 
21 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.922 (1953): "In the following cases ... every agreement, 
contract and promise shall be void, unless . . • in writing and signed by the party 
to be charged therewith [including] every agreement that, by its terms, is not to be 
performed in one year from the making thereof .•.. " 
22 Sutton v. Rowley, 44 Mich. 112, 6 N.W. 216 (1880); accord, Hummel v. Hummel, 
133 Ohio St. 520, 14 N.E.2d 923 (1938); Colonial Brick Co. v. Zimmerman, 255 Mich. 655, 
239 N.W. 301 (1931) (dictum) . 
.23 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.86(1) (1957): "In order to safeguard and protect home 
owners and persons undertaking to become homeowners . . . ." 
24 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.86(1) (1957): " ••• it shall be unlawful on and after the 
effective date of this act for any person to engage in the business of or to act in the 
capacity of a residential builder and/ or ... alteration contractor ... without having 
a license therefor . • • ." 
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read and interpret specifications, and, if the commission so requires, sub-
mits "reasonable evidence" of ability to perform the duties of an alteration 
contractor. But "satisfactory proof" of having been in the business of 
residential contracting for five years is prima facie proof of fitness to carry 
on the business, and eliminates the necessity of taking the examination.2G 
One who has no license and violates a provision of the act may be fined 
up to $500, imprisoned up to six months, or both.26 Furthermore, one who 
engages in such a business without a license cannot bring an action in 
the state courts for the collection of compensation.27 In its analysis of the 
statute it seems that the court's interpretation of the meaning of the term 
"home" was derived from an extension of the definition of a "residential 
maintenance and alteration contractor"28 to include one who alters or 
repairs a structure used for both residential and commercial purposes. The 
court's construction that "home owners" included any owner of any struc-
ture housing a residence obscures the fact that the probable goal of the 
legislators was the protection of the non-commercial home owner, not the 
commercial investor who would be less likely to be mulcted by the incom-
petent or fly-by-night contractor. Since a non-commercial home owner 
25 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.86(4) (1957): "Every residential builder and/ or residential 
maintenance and alteration contractor shall maintain a place of business in this state 
•.•. The commission is hereby authorized to require any applicant and/or licensee 
to submit reasonable evidence of his ability to perform his duties as a residential 
builder and/or residential maintenance and alteration contractor. 
"The commission shall also require each applicant for a license to pass a written exam-
ination establishing, in a manner satisfactory to the commission, that the applicant has 
a fair knowledge of the English language including ... an ability to read and interpret 
plans and specifications • . • . Satisfactory proof of having been engaged in the busi-
ness of contracting for the erection, construction, . . . wrecking of or demolition of 
residential or combination of residential and commercial structures for a period of 5 
years shall be prima facie proof of the applicant's fitness to carry on said business, 
and he shall not be required to take said examination . • . .'' 
26 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.86(16) (1957): "Any person •.. acting in the capacity of 
a residential builder and/or residential maintenance and alteration contractor within 
the meaning of this act, who shall violate any of the provisions of this act, without 
a license as herein provided ... shall upon conviction thereof, if a natural person, be 
punished by a fine not to exceed $500.00, or by imprisonment in the county jail for a 
term not to exceed 6 months, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion 
of the court." 
27 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.86(16) (1957): "No person engaged in the business or 
acting in the capacity of a residential builder and/or residential maintenance and 
alteration contractor may bring or maintain any action in any court of this state for 
the collection of compensation for the performance of any act or contract for which 
a license is required by this act without alleging and proving that he was duly licensed 
under this act at all times during the performance of such act or contract . . • ." 
2s MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.86(2)(c) (1957): "Residential maintenance and alteration 
contractor shall be construed to mean any person who, for a fixed sum, ••. or other 
compensation, other than wages, undertakes with another for the repair, alteration or 
any addition to, • . . improvement of, . . . or demolition of a residential structure 
or combination of residential and commercial structures, except for his own use and 
occupancy .•. .'' 
1962] RECENT DECISIONS 827 
might reside in a partially commercial structure, it was necessary to extend 
the statute's coverage to contractors who worked on combination residen-
tial-commercial structures. Yet that provision does not justify the court's 
decision that one investing but not residing in such a combination building 
was intended to come within the scope of the act. Since defendants were 
probably not intended to be protected by the act, it seems ·that they should 
not be allowed to invoke the "illegality" of the transaction in which they 
participated as a bar to restitutionary relief. Moreover, in view of the 
doubt that the act applied to the plaintiff at all, it is questionable whether 
the court should even have denied recovery on the contract. In addition, 
though there are penalties for contracting without a license, the ease with 
which the requirements for obtaining a license may be met29-which the 
court apparently overlooked-seems to negate the strength the court at-
tributed to the statute. Considering the dubiousness of the application 
of the statute to plaintiff, and the doubt that the legislature intended the 
statute to have the coverage and effect attributed to it by the court, it is 
submitted that the court erred in denying restitutionary relief in the 
principal case. The factors which compel the conclusion that defendant's 
enrichment was unjust far outweigh the reasons justifying defendant's 
retention of any benefit.ao 
Stefan Tucker 
29 See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.86(4) (1957). The text is at note 25 supra. 
30 See DAWSON &: PALMER, CAsES ON REsrrruTION 1018 (rev. ed. 1958). 
